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A NEW THREAT TO THE VIABILITY OF CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
Brent Ferguson
In July, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it violates the First
Amendment to prevent political candidates from coordinating with outside
spending groups like Super PACs if the groups’ ads do not expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a candidate.1 The decision is erroneous under federal
precedent and fundamentally misunderstands the Supreme Court’s holdings
distinguishing between independent spending and spending coordinated with a
candidate. Wisconsin’s regulatory scheme will be largely inoperable for the
time being: Contribution limits will be fairly meaningless, at least for
sophisticated actors who seek to circumvent them. And the logic of the
decision leads to the conclusion that candidates have the constitutional right to
set up campaign accounts that may accept unlimited contributions, so long as
that money is not used for express advocacy.
Because the court’s reasoning lacked a coherent basis or a foundation in
federal case law, it may not be overly optimistic to think that other state or
federal courts will reject its reasoning. Yet there are indications that at least
some regulators and courts may share the Wisconsin court’s view,2 and there is
little doubt that the issue will arise in other states. This Article will review the
law of coordination, as well as recent Supreme Court case law relied upon by
 Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. The views expressed herein are mine, not
those of the Brennan Center. Thanks very much to Ian Vandewalker, Dan Weiner, and Larry Norden for their
review and suggestions, and to the editors at the Emory Law Journal.
1 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2015). Several Wisconsin
district attorneys have stated their intention to file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which
is due April 29, 2016. Chisholm v. Eight Unnamed Movants, Case No. 15A860 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2016) (granting
a motion to extend time to file a petition for certiorari). The holding allows for coordination regulations if
resulting advertisements contain “express advocacy [or] its functional equivalent.” Id. at 186. Advertisements
containing express advocacy or its functional equivalent are election-related communications that are
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
2 See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Wis. 2014), clarified by No. 14-C-139, 2014
WL 2446316 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2014). Even before Peterson, Arizona’s election enforcement agency
indicated a belief similar to that endorsed by the Peterson court. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, Tr.
of Public Meeting 14-16 (Oct. 22, 2010) (explaining belief that “Wisconsin Right to Life and other Supreme
Court cases” require that there be “‘no other reasonable meaning’” before a communication qualifies as
express advocacy, and understanding the express advocacy limitation to apply to coordination rules).
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the Wisconsin court, to demonstrate the court’s error. It will also address
several of the effects the decision will have in Wisconsin and elsewhere if
other courts similarly depart from longstanding precedent.
I. COORDINATION LAW AND THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
A. The Development of Coordination Law
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), a reform bill passed
after Watergate, limited contributions to candidates as well as political
expenditures made without a candidate’s involvement. Reviewing the law in
Buckley v. Valeo,3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that limiting direct
contributions to candidates was permissible, but limiting independent
expenditures was not.4 The Court’s theory was that candidates could be
corrupted by direct contributions, but independent spending in their favor
could be less helpful to a candidate and therefore created a “substantially
diminished potential for abuse.”5 The Court in Citizens United v. FEC went
further, simply concluding that independent spending “do[es] not give rise to
corruption.”6
With the advent of the constitutional distinction between the two types of
spending, the definition of “contribution” became quite important. As the
Court recognized in Buckley, spending by an “outside” group that takes
directions from the candidate may be treated as a contribution because the
candidate will get a similar benefit from that spending (and feel similar
gratitude) as she would if the money went straight to her campaign.7 Citizens
United took the same view, clearly distinguishing between truly independent
spending and spending coordinated with a candidate.8 Thus, the federal
government and most states have long regulated coordination between
3

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id.
5 Id. at 47. The Buckley Court also addressed vagueness concerns about the definitions of contributions
and independent expenditures—the plaintiffs argued that the statute did not clearly limit the scope of
permissible regulation. Buckley upheld FECA’s definition of “contribution,” which encompassed all donations
“made for the purpose of influencing” an election. Id. at 23 & n.24. But with regard to independent
expenditures, the Court held that “to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds” the law
should “apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44.
6 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
7 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78.
8 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46) (“By definition, an independent
expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.”).
4
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candidates and outside groups (or individuals) in order to determine what
spending should be treated as an indirect contribution.9
Typically such laws prevent candidates from engaging in substantial
discussion with outside groups, and also make sure that outside groups do not
employ anyone who works for a candidate, among other things. The laws
stayed out of the spotlight for the most part until independent spending began
to sharply increase after Citizens United and the rise of Super PACs beginning
in 2010. Yet with the emerging dominance of outside spending, candidates and
their supportive groups have often sought to operate more closely than the law
would seem to allow. While the phenomenon may be most closely associated
with Jeb Bush’s pre-candidacy operation10 and the expanded role of other
Super PACs early in the 2016 presidential race,11 those methods were merely
an innovation in a field that had existed for years.
Campaign finance reformers and their opponents have argued extensively
about laws defining indirect contributions, and those disputes have centered
principally on the types of conduct that should be regulable: for example, if a
candidate raises money for a Super PAC that later spends in his favor, should
that mean that the group’s spending counts as a contribution? But the fight in
Wisconsin was different: it centered on the content of the outside groups’
advertisements, not the collaboration between candidate and group. Under
Under Wisconsin’s (now invalidated) law, and that of many states, if a
candidate controlled an outside group’s spending, the group’s campaign ads
counted as contributions as long as they were election-related—the same
standard applied to any cash or in-kind contribution.12 Federal law has a
somewhat narrower window: the spending qualifies as a contribution only if
the resulting ad (1) mentions the candidate’s name and is run within a ninety9

For a lengthier discussion of the history of coordination law, see Brent Ferguson, Beyond
Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
471 (2015).
10 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Nick Corasaniti, Jeb Bush, Taking His Time, Tests the Legal Definition of
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/politics/jeb-bush-taking-histime-tests-the-legal-definition-of-candidate.html.
11 See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti, Carly Fiornia’s ‘Super PAC’ Aids Her Campaign, in Plain Sight, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/us/politics/as-carly-fiorina-surges-so-does-thework-of-her-super-pac.html.
12 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.01(6), 11.06(7) (West Supp. 2016); Wis. Coal. for Voter Participation, Inc. v.
State Elections Bd., 605 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(b)(2)
(West 2015); 94-270 ME. CODE R. § 6(9) (LexisNexis 2016); Findings and Conclusions 11–12, In re
Complaint by Benjamin Ancona, No. 2013-140 (Conn. State Elections Enf’t Comm’n June 18, 2014),
http://seec.ct.gov/e2casebase/data/fd/FD_2013_140.pdf.
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day window before the election, or (2) expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a candidate.13 The Wisconsin plaintiffs argued that regardless of
whether a candidate controlled an outside group, the group’s spending is only
regulable as a contribution if it runs an ad expressly advocating the candidate’s
election.
B. The Wisconsin Case and Its Opinions
In 2012, an Assistant District Attorney in Milwaukee filed a petition to
begin an investigation into whether Governor Scott Walker’s campaign
committee illegally coordinated with several groups that spent money in
support of his 2012 recall election.14 The prosecutors believed that one of
Walker’s aides may have directed both Walker’s campaign committee and
Wisconsin Club for Growth, which he allegedly used “as a ‘hub’ to coordinate
fundraising and issue advocacy” for both the campaign and the outside
groups.15
It is not necessary to explain the full, complex procedural history of the
case here, but three written opinions are relevant: (1) the federal district court’s
May 2014 order calling a halt to the investigation; (2) the Seventh Circuit’s
order reversing the district court and dismissing the suit so it could be resolved
in state court; and (3) the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s July 2015 decision
terminating the investigation.
In February 2014, a director of the Club for Growth sued in federal court to
stop the state’s investigation. The court granted a preliminary injunction a few
months later, ordering the state to end its inquiry and return or permanently
destroy all information obtained through the investigation.16 Though its
substantive reasoning was not fully clear, the court appeared to conclude17 that

13 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c) (2015). For presidential and vice presidential candidates, the window begins 120
days before the primary election. Id. § 109.21(c)(4)(ii).
14 See Patrick Marley, Daniel Bice & Lee Bergquist, Walker Wanted Funds Funneled to Wisconsin Club
for Growth, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/walkerwanted-funds-sent-to-wisconsin-club-for-growth-b99336519z1-272364371.html.
15 O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861, 867 (E.D. Wis. 2014), clarified by No. 14-C-139, 2014 WL
2446316 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2014); see also Niraj Chokshi, Prosecutors Allege Gov. Scott Walker Schemed to
Bypass Campaign Laws, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2014/06/19/prosecutors-allege-gov-scott-walker-schemed-to-bypass-election-laws/.
16 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 875.
17 As described by the Seventh Circuit, the lower court decision held that the First Amendment
“forbids . . . penalties for coordination between political committees and groups that engage in issue
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neither Wisconsin law nor the U.S. Constitution permitted the state to regulate
coordination between a candidate and an outside group if the group’s election
ads did not contain express advocacy: “A candidate’s coordination with and
approval of issue advocacy speech . . . does not rise to the level of ‘favors for
cash.’ Logic instructs that there is no room for a quid pro quo arrangement
when the views of the candidate and the issue advocacy organization
coincide.”18
The Seventh Circuit immediately stayed the district court’s order that the
investigators destroy or return all documents and, several months later,
reversed the decision granting the injunction.19 While its decision was
principally based on the need to defer to ongoing litigation in state court, the
court demonstrated a solid understanding of coordination law. It correctly
explained that the Supreme Court has held that “the government is entitled to
regulate coordination between candidates’ campaigns and purportedly
independent groups,” but has yet to fully define the scope of permissible
coordination regulation.20 The court acknowledged that coordination rules are
necessary to prevent circumvention of contribution limits, and while “[t]he
district court thought that the Supreme Court will overrule what remains of
Buckley,” its approval of contribution limits still stands for now.21
The Seventh Circuit’s decision brought no certainty, of course, and the case
was heard by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which issued a decision halting
the investigation in July 2015. The case was controversial in several respects,
in part due to charges of politicization of the case on both sides, as well as
years of acrimony between justices on the Wisconsin court.22
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that because state law treated
coordinated expenditures as contributions any time they were made for

advocacy,” as well as any investigation to learn what type of coordination occurred. O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769
F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 2014).
18 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 872. It is unclear why the court believed that such corruption is impossible
when a group aligned with a candidate does not expressly advocate for a candidate, but it presumably is
possible if the ad contains express advocacy.
19 Chisholm, 769 F.3d at 937, 939.
20 Id. at 941.
21 Id. (citing Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 635–40 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
22 The Wisconsin Supreme Court is sharply divided along ideological lines, and the case took place
during a dispute over which justice had the legal right to the title of chief justice. See Mitch Smith, Wisconsin
Chief Justice Files a Lawsuit to Avoid Demotion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/us/wisconsin-chief-justice-files-a-lawsuit-to-avoid-demotion.html.
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political purposes, the law was overbroad and vague; to save the statute, it held
that coordinated expenditures could only be treated as contributions if the
resulting communications contained express advocacy.23 The majority opinion
was long on discussion of broad First Amendment principles, and it included
expansive language predicting dire consequences that would occur if
Wisconsin law were interpreted to allow the state to regulate coordination as it
had since at least 1999.24 The court did not examine any Supreme Court
holdings on the issue of coordination, or explain the basis of its belief that an
election-related “issue ad,” aired by an advocacy group just before an election
but controlled by a candidate, could not lead to regulable corruption.25
II. ERROR OF LAW
The argument made by the Wisconsin plaintiffs is not new, and it was flatly
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court twelve years ago in McConnell v. FEC.26
One challenge to the 2002 McCain–Feingold campaign finance law was that
“the First Amendment limits the coordination concept to express advocacy.”27
The Court explained that the statute clearly applied coordination rules even
“for communications that avoid express advocacy,” and affirmed the district
court’s decision to uphold the coordination section of the law, concluding that
“there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for
electioneering communications in the same way it treats all other coordinated
expenditures.”28
The rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument was not limited to the five-justice
majority opinion; Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reached
the same result. Justice Kennedy’s opinion explained that he would “uphold
[the law] as to its candidate coordination regulation” because the law satisfied
Buckley’s anticorruption interest by “treat[ing] electioneering communications
expenditures made by a person in coordination with a candidate as hard-money

23

State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 193 (Wis. 2015).
See, e.g., Wis. Coal. for Voter Participation, 605 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1999). For example, the majority
predicted that if the “prosecutor’s theories” were adopted, it “would assure that such political speech will be
investigated with paramilitary-style home invasions conducted in the pre-dawn hours.” Peterson, 866 N.W.2d
at 194.
25 A new coordination law that adheres to the Peterson holding was signed into law by Governor Scott
Walker in December 2015. See 2015–2016 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 117 (West).
26 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
27 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 249 (D.D.C. 2003).
28 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 202–03; see also FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 88 (D.D.C. 1999).
24

FERGUSON GALLEYS1

2026

3/15/2016 12:36 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 65:2020

contributions to that candidate.”29 This discussion by Justice Kennedy was
included in the same opinion in which he voted (with the dissent) to strike
down the ban on corporate spending, which he would do successfully seven
years later in Citizens United.
It is true that the Wisconsin law operated somewhat more broadly than the
federal law at issue in McConnell—the federal coordinated expenditure
provision applies only to electioneering communications, not all expenditures
made for political purposes. Thus, one could argue that because McConnell
does not opine on whether coordinated expenditures that are made for political
purposes (but would not fall in the federal electioneering communications
window) may be treated as contributions, the Peterson Court’s decision does
not violate Supreme Court precedent. Setting Buckley aside, the argument
would be plausible if Peterson’s language did not foreclose that interpretation:
the Wisconsin court made quite clear that it would strike down any coordinated
expenditure provision that regulated communications that do not contain
express advocacy or its functional equivalent.30
As explained by Justice Kennedy, the seven-Justice McConnell holding on
this point flows directly from the logic of Buckley. Simply put, Buckley held
both that (1) coordinated expenditures could be treated as contributions;31 and
that (2) the definition of “contributions” need not be limited to payments made
for express advocacy, but could extend to payments “made for the purpose of
influencing” an election.32
Even before McConnell was decided, the most influential case to directly
address this subject, FEC v. Christian Coalition, reached the same conclusion
as the Supreme Court and noted the absurdity of the express advocacy
argument.33 The court cogently explained that “importing the ‘express
advocacy’ standard into [the] contribution prohibition would misread Buckley
29 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 319 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy would have struck down the provision as applied to spending coordinated with political parties. Id.
30 See, e.g., Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 193 (“[W]ithout a limiting construction [the law] could just as
easily include issue advocacy aired during the closing days of an election cycle.”); id. (relying on Buckley and
WRTL to hold that “[i]n order to cure this overbreadth and vagueness,” Wisconsin law could only be applied to
groups engaging in express advocacy or its functional equivalent).
31 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1976) (per curiam).
32 Id. at 23–30, 78–79 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)); see also Orloski v. FEC, 795
F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that under Buckley, the express advocacy limitation “is not
constitutionally required for those statutory provisions limiting contributions” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78–
80)).
33 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
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and collapse the distinction between contributions and independent
expenditures in such a way as to give short shrift to the government’s
compelling interest in preventing real and perceived corruption that can flow
from large campaign contributions.”34
The Wisconsin plaintiffs and the judges who provided their victory might
argue that the law has changed since McConnell. They are correct in broad
terms: FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL)35 eroded McConnell and
Citizens United partially overruled it, such that bans on independent spending
by corporations and unions are now impermissible.36 And in 2014,
McCutcheon v. FEC held that the federal aggregate contribution limits were
unconstitutional.37
None of these decisions overruled McConnell’s holding that coordinated
expenditures may be limited even when the resulting communication did not
contain express advocacy, and none contained dicta that would indicate
willingness to do so.38 Citizens United and WRTL,39 in fact, focused solely on
independent spending and repeatedly emphasized the difference between
independent expenditures and contributions for constitutional purposes.40

34

Id.
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
36 Id.
37 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
38 As noted above, Justice Kennedy in McConnell already would have struck down the corporate
spending ban as he did in Citizens United, but he voted to uphold the relevant coordination provisions. See
supra note 30.
39 WRTL held that corporate spending could not be banned unless the resulting advertisement was
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469–70. That holding was rendered obsolete by Citizens United, which held that domestic
corporate spending may never be banned. The WRTL test survived for less than three years and has no bearing
on which coordinated expenditures should be treated as contributions. WRTL left unchanged the fact that
contributions may be limited if given for political purposes, regardless of whether the resulting advertisements
contain express advocacy.
40 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–58; WRTL, 551 U.S. at 478–79 (holding that truly independent issue
ads were not equivalent to contributions in terms of risk of corruption).
In determining whether a case like Citizens United repudiated McConnell, a lower court must closely
examine each case’s logical underpinnings. See, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615–19 (4th
Cir. 2012) (upholding federal corporate contribution ban and concluding that “Citizens United, a case that
addresses corporate independent expenditures, does not undermine Beaumont’s reasoning on this point”); see
also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (explaining that future courts must “adhere not
only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law” (quoting
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
35
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Neither the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision nor the federal district court
opinion articulated exactly why or how recent Supreme Court cases have
altered the law to mean that McConnell’s holding should be ignored. In fact,
neither acknowledged McConnell’s holding on the issue.41 Each holding was
rife with references to more recent decisions but mainly cited general
quotations that provide little in the way of analysis of the particular issue at
hand.
In Peterson, the majority opinion began by drawing a sharp distinction
between issue advocacy and election advocacy, implying all the while that
anything less than express advocacy qualifies as issue advocacy, which cannot
be regulated.42 It drew heavily on Supreme Court cases but generally used
either broad phrasing or quotations taken out of context as a justification for its
conclusion, and it did not address Buckley’s decision to allow limits on
contributions made for purposes broader than express advocacy.
For example, the Peterson majority relied on WRTL for the proposition that
“[t]he compelling governmental interest that justifies the regulation of express
advocacy (the prevention of quid pro quo corruption) ‘might not apply to’ the
regulation of issue advocacy.”43 Yet that phrase in WRTL was drawn from
McConnell, which, as shown above, mandates a conclusion different than the
one the court reached in Peterson. More generally, the WRTL Court reviewed a
ban on corporate independent spending that contained issue advocacy,
meaning that its language is unhelpful if applied to coordinated expenditures,
which have been consistently treated as contributions before and after WRTL.
Similarly, the Court cited McCutcheon for its statement that “[s]pending
large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with
an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not
give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.”44 While the Peterson Court’s
reference implies that that money spent “in connection with elections” means
issue advocacy, McCutcheon had nothing to do with issue advocacy; by
discussing spending “in connection with elections,” the McCutcheon Court
sought to distinguish between contributions made directly to a candidate
(which might cause corruption) and contributions made to a group of other

41 The Peterson dissent discussed McConnell’s holding, so the majority was presumably aware of its
existence. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 390.
42 Id. at 188.
43 Id. (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 188 (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014)).
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candidates (which the Court held would not lead to corruption of the original
candidate).45
While there are various other references to federal precedent in Peterson
that provide little support for its conclusion, the fundamental flaw in the
decision is its refusal to acknowledge that the law still treats coordinated
expenditures as contributions. The majority did not address, and could not
deny, the fact that limits on contributions to candidates have long been applied
to all payments made for the purpose of influencing elections, and that has not
changed despite WRTL, Citizens United, McCutcheon, or any other case.
III. CONSEQUENCES
Peterson cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s holdings, and it
directly contravenes McConnell. But perhaps more importantly, even without
McConnell’s direct holding, the decision cannot survive in a campaign finance
world ruled by Buckley’s contribution–expenditure distinction. As this section
will show, the Wisconsin court’s logical premise—that electioneering is not
regulable if it does not contain express advocacy or its equivalent—creates a
loophole so large that contribution limits will be meaningless, at least for those
willing to circumvent them.
A. Unlimited Coordination Between Candidates and Outside Groups
The prosecutor in Wisconsin alleged that Governor Scott Walker’s
campaign directed spending by “independent” groups, essentially making the

45

The majority also relied on a recent Seventh Circuit decision, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland
(Barland II), which included broad language stating that “the government’s authority to regulate in this area
extends only to money raised and spent for speech that is clearly election related; ordinary political speech
about issues, policy, and public officials must remain unencumbered.” 751 F.3d 804, 810–11 (7th Cir. 2014).
The clearest indication that Barland II did not control the result of Peterson is that the Seventh Circuit did not
rely on it when addressing the very same issue in O’Keefe. The dissenting opinion in Peterson contains a
thorough discussion of why Barland II’s holding is inapplicable to the realm of coordinated expenditures.
Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 267.
The Barland II court was referring specifically to Buckley and its holdings concerning disclosure of
independent expenditures, but the Peterson Court applied it to coordinated expenditures without
acknowledging the distinction. Of course, if Barland II’s language were indeed taken to mean that no
regulation could extend to anything other than express advocacy, that would mean that standard contribution
limits would be unconstitutional as applied to non-express advocacy. The Barland II court did not address that
issue, and clearly did not intend to go so far, given its direct reliance on Buckley.

FERGUSON GALLEYS1

2030

3/15/2016 12:36 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 65:2020

groups little more than puppets for the campaign.46 A long line of federal
precedent would hold that this collaboration triggers contribution limits (or
bans, in the case of corporations) on the groups’ spending because Governor
Walker would be likely to view the money given to those groups as
contributions to his campaign. Common sense leads to the same conclusion: if
the candidate decides how the money is spent (or provides any strong
indication of its value to him),47 he is just as likely to provide an impermissible
reward to those who gave him the money to spend.
The Christian Coalition court, which has performed the most extensive
analysis of coordination law to date, recognized the likely results if
coordination rules were limited to express advocacy: “Were this standard
adopted, it would open the door to unrestricted corporate or union underwriting
of numerous campaign-related communications that do not expressly advocate
a candidate’s election or defeat.”48
The Christian Coalition court’s prediction now applies to Wisconsin: under
Peterson, the state may not limit contributions to the affiliated groups, as long
as they run ads that do not contain express advocacy or its equivalent. And
under Citizens United and later cases, all such groups may accept unlimited
corporate contributions. Conveniently, candidates often do not use express
advocacy anyway.49 Thus, a candidate’s campaign manager may start a Super
PAC, the candidate may write the ad, star in it, tout his record, criticize his
opponent, and the Super PAC may run the ad the day before the election, and
all is legal if the candidate does not say “vote for me” or something similar at
the end. Considering this potential, it is difficult to say that there are now
effective contribution limits in Wisconsin.50
46 Candidates regularly used multiple “independent” campaign committees to circumvent campaign
finance restrictions until the practice was outlawed by the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971. See DAVID
C.W. PARKER, THE POWER OF MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS, 1880–2006, at 110 (2008).
47 See Ferguson, supra note 9.
48 FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 25, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
49 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127 (2003) (“[C]ampaign professionals testified that the most
effective campaign ads . . . should, and did, avoid the use of [express advocacy].”); see also id. at 127 n.18
(finding use of express advocacy in 5% or less of candidate advertisements in the 1998 and 2000 elections);
see also Michael M. Franz, Joel Rivlin & Kenneth Goldstein, Much More of the Same: Television Advertising
Pre and Post-BCRA, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN
REFORM ACT 141, 144 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006) (concluding that candidates only used express advocacy
in 11.4% of their advertisements in the 2000 election).
50 Florida has operated under the Peterson rule for years, providing some preview of how things may
change in Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.011(8)(c) (West 2015) (“For purposes of this chapter, an
expenditure made for, or in furtherance of, an electioneering communication is not considered a contribution to
or on behalf of any candidate.”). As of September 2014, outside groups and political parties were responsible
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Individuals and outside groups will certainly use the rule to get closer to
candidates, but the decision will also have widespread effects on corporate
giving and disclosure rules. Corporations are still banned from making direct
contributions to candidates under federal law, and are banned or subjected to
low limits under many state laws, including Wisconsin.51 Yet under Citizens
United and later cases, they may make unlimited independent expenditures
themselves or give unlimited funds to other groups that engage in such
spending. After Peterson, corporations or groups supported by them, just like
individuals, will in essence be permitted to give unlimited money to a
candidate, as long as the resulting advertisements do not contain express
advocacy.
Further, it will be difficult to know the extent to which this is happening
and who is funding the spending. All or most states have reasonably good rules
requiring disclosure of contributions directly to candidates. Those disclosure
rules are simplified because candidates have one campaign account and are
responsible for reporting. But mandating useful disclosure from outside groups
has proven much more difficult: some states barely try, and the federal
government and other states have mediocre laws that can be easily
circumvented by those willing to move their money through multiple entities.52
Under Peterson, this will still occur, but candidates will have greater control
over the spending, and in all likelihood will be fully aware of its original
source.53
B. Unlimited Campaign Contributions
If candidates may engage in unlimited coordination with “outside” groups,
there is no clear logical basis for Wisconsin to prevent candidates themselves
from raising unlimited contributions to their campaign accounts, as long as
for over 96% of election advertising in the Florida Governor’s race. See Rachel Baye, ‘Outside’ Groups
Swamp Florida’s Airwaves in Race for Governor, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/24/15553/outside-groups-swamp-floridas-airwaves-race-governor.
51 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.1112 (West Supp. 2016).
52 See, e.g., IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELECTION SPENDING 2014: OUTSIDE
SPENDING IN SENATE RACES SINCE CITIZENS UNITED 2 (2015) (noting that almost half of the $1 billion in
independent spending over last three election cycles came from undisclosed original sources); see also, Daniel
I. Weiner & Brent Ferguson, Wisconsin Legislature Should Reject Secrecy Bill, J. SENTINEL (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://m.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin-legislature-should-reject-secrecy-bill-b99605680z1-339024381.html
(explaining recent weakening of Wisconsin disclosure laws).
53 See Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (“Coordinated expenditures for such communications would
be substantially more valuable than dollar-equivalent contributions because they come with an ‘anonymity
premium’ of great value to a candidate running a positive campaign.”).
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they do not spend on express advocacy.54 The court in Peterson held that the
state may not even examine how a group and a candidate work together on ads
that do not contain express advocacy, meaning the candidate may do all the
fundraising, write the advertisements, and even take checks directly from
donors.55
Is there any constitutional distinction between (1) allowing a candidate to
perform activities like solicitation and receipt of money, ad writing, and
strategy planning under the aegis of a nominally separate group and
(2) allowing candidates to do all of the same things for his or her own
campaign committee? The answer should be no, unless a court were to give
substantial weight to the superficial question of who is the group’s nominal
leader. It is true that in some circumstances, bestowing official candidatesanctioned status on an entity will change how it is viewed, or how it should be
permitted to function. Yet with the prospect of candidates controlling outside
groups and raising money for them, as they may under Peterson, there is no
substantive distinction between such groups.
One could argue that if a candidate solicits money or creates an ad for her
own campaign committee (rather than a nominally independent group), that
activity is more solidly a part of the campaign itself, at least as far as voters
and potential donors could tell; perhaps the risk of such appearances could
mean that contributions to campaign committees could be limited under an
honest reading of Peterson.56 In some circumstances, this could be plausible,
yet in cases of extensive candidate control of an outside group, it would be
quite difficult to believe that many voters or donors would be aware of such a
distinction based solely on a committee’s official affiliation.57 The formalism

54 Campaign committee funds could be separated into two accounts, one of which may accept unlimited
funds, like a hybrid PAC. See, e.g., Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011). There is a separate
question of whether the campaign account accepting unlimited funds could receive certain benefits of typical
campaign accounts, such as preferential advertising rates, that will not be addressed here.
55 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165. The district court in O’Keefe hinted at an understanding that its ruling
would mean that direct contributions to candidates could not be limited if the money was to be used for
anything other than express advocacy. O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861, 870–71 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(concluding that “regulation setting contribution limits on express advocacy . . . is permitted,” but “‘issue
advocacy money[]’ is not subject to these limitations”).
56 Peterson’s holding did not appear to hinge on any requirement that a group make clear that its
activities were nominally separate from a campaign’s.
57 Because under Peterson a regulator may not examine the extent of candidate control over an outside
group if it does not engage in express advocacy, there could be no attempt to determine whether candidate
control reached a point such that the distinction between candidate committee and outside group was
meaningless for voters or donors.
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that would be required to allow a candidate to perform such activities for a
nominally independent group, yet prevent a candidate from performing those
activities for his own committee, would be difficult for any court to bear.
C. A Broader Look
Considering the dominance of Super PACs in the coming 2016 presidential
election, FEC inaction, and dim prospects for reform in Congress, it is
tempting to conclude that a nationwide adoption of the Wisconsin rule would
be relatively inconsequential. That conclusion would be mistaken.
On the federal level, it is true that candidates and Super PACs are already
operating fairly closely with ostensible immunity. But candidates at least
profess to maintain distance from supportive groups after campaign
announcements, and that flimsy wall may do a bit to keep the candidate from
rewarding donors, especially if the Super PAC’s spending proves to be less
helpful than the candidate would have preferred. For example, Governor
Walker exited the Presidential race in September 2015 despite the fact that his
Super PAC had plenty of money, because the PAC could not pay “phone bills,
salaries, airfares or ballot access fees. They are not entitled to the preferential
rates on advertising that federal law grants candidates, forcing them to pay far
more money than candidates must for the same television and radio time.”58
Application of the Wisconsin rule on the federal level could allow candidates
with support from only a few wealthy donors to survive.
And in some states, coordination rules are robust and well-enforced.
California, Connecticut, and Minnesota, for example, have fairly strong rules
that are enforced by agencies willing to clarify the law and issue penalties for
illegal activity.59 While Super PACs and other big-spending groups can still
58 Nicholas Confessore, Demise of Scott Walker’s 2016 Bid Shows Limits of ‘Super PACs,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/us/politics/scott-walkers-demise-shows-limits-of-superpac-money-model.html; David Karol, If You Think Super PACs Have Changed Everything
About the Presidential Primary, Think Again, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/21/if-you-think-super-pacs-have-changedeverything-about-the-presidential-primary-think-again/ (“Perry’s withdrawal from the race despite having
several millions left in his super PAC coffers is a reminder that candidates still need ‘hard money’ to provide
for campaign expenses. A candidate who is doing very badly will have a hard time raising such funds.”).
59 See CHISUN LEE, BRENT FERGUSON & DAVID EARLEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, AFTER CITIZENS
UNITED: THE STORY IN THE STATES 18 (2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/after-citizensunited-story-states. For example, California’s regulator recently fined a candidate when two of his campaign
employees left the campaign to work for an outside group that spent on his behalf. Ramona Giwargis, Former
Assemblyman Joe Coto Charged with Hefty FPPC Fine, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Aug. 10, 2015),
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dominate elections in those states, there is a real divide between those groups
and candidates. Aside from the Supreme Court, only a naïve observer would
conclude that the separation means that top donors to Super PACs do not have
excessive influence over elected officials. Nevertheless, candidates cannot
fully direct Super PAC spending, and are likely at least somewhat less inclined
to follow the bidding of those donors.
Aside from the direct effect on near-term elections, rejection of Peterson is
important for the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the strength of our
election laws. No close observer maintains that the Court has stayed consistent
in campaign finance cases in recent years, or that our judge-made patchwork of
rules is healthy for American democracy. But the answer is not ignoring
precedent or predicting the Court’s next watershed holding. Deregulation by
lack of enforcement has already destabilized campaign rules, forcing
candidates to decide whether to play by the rules and risk severe disadvantage
or to bend the law and stay even with the pack. If the final obstacle preventing
direct unlimited contributions is to be removed, it should be done legislatively
or by the Supreme Court. Doing otherwise will simply create confusion
amongst candidates and other political actors and decrease their confidence in
our election system.
***
While Buckley’s days may be numbered, the case has shown an unlikely
staying power over the recent decades, and its demise is not guaranteed to
come anytime soon. And regardless of its chances for survival, it is governing
law. Peterson is unsustainable under Buckley—if its reasoning is adopted
broadly, contribution limits will have little meaning, at least for those who are
willing to push the limits of the law. The consequences of a piecemeal and
ambiguous elimination of contribution limits will be detrimental to upcoming
elections and our democracy more broadly.

http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20150810/former-assemblyman-joe-coto-charged-with-heftyfppc-fine/2.

